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Abstract
We adopt a real options approach to analyse the value of recently auctioned UMTS-
licenses, focussing on Germany as the largest European market. For that purpose
we develop a real options model with an abandonment as well as a growth option.
Not having an appropriate underlying security of the options, we pursue an indirect
approach by assuming a stochastic process for the number of mobile phone users.
As we also take account of the optimal option exercise, we have to rely on numerical
analysis rather than on closed form solutions. Our real options model enables us to
value the flexibility inherent in the UMTS investments. On the basis of a sensitivity
analysis it turns out that two variables are crucial for a positive expected value of
the investments: the initial customer base of a mobile phone company as well as the
realised net cash flows per user.
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Non-technical Summary
Real options modelling is currently revolutionising decision making and valuati-
on processes across corporate America and among leading corporations around the
world. It is a new and powerful valuation and strategic decision-making paradigm
when investment projects are to be undertaken in highly uncertain environments.
The real options approach captures the value of managerial flexibility to react to
future developments with the benefit of better information. Traditional techniques
like discounted cash flow analysis do not take this potential value of managerial fle-
xibility into account. Thereby, a potentially large part of the value of an investment
project is neglected and investment decisions are heavily distorted. In contrast to the
traditional techniques, the real options approach builds upon the methods developed
in option pricing theory. This not only allows to quantify the value of managerial
flexibility but also provides a challenging new way of thinking.
We employ this new valuation technique to address one of the largest investments
undertaken by a group of companies, the investment in UMTS-licenses. Focussing
on the auction of UMTS-licenses in Germany, our basic question is whether the
licenses can ever be worth their money. We then analyse for which licensees this is
most likely to be the case. The general model we develop here is applicable to a
larger number of valuation problems. Therefore, our study can easily be used as a
starting point to evaluate highly uncertain investments other than UMTS, such as
R&D projects or e-commerce investments.
The development of a real options model allows us to capture and quantify
the uncertainty as well as the potential flexibility associated with the new mobile
phone technology. We thereby allow both for an abandonment option and a growth
option. It turns out that the latter is the more important option associated with
the UMTS-licenses. It stems from the fact that UMTS enables the operators to
potentially exploit the spectrum of transmissions by supplying further applications.
Adding both option values to the conventional value of discounted cash flows gives
us a comprehensive and complete picture of the UMTS investments and avoids
i
neglecting crucial elements in their valuation.
We show that for the average license, the growth option is often the decisive
factor: in its absence, the total net value of the investment is negative and the
telecom firms do not earn the money they have spent. In the benchmark case, the net
value of the investment amounts to Euro -1220 million in the absence of the growth
option. Including the option, our analysis shows that investing in UMTS-licenses
may indeed create value for the firms’ shareholders as the net value increases to Euro
1824 million. With a detailed sensitivity analysis for the underlying parameters, we
are able to identify the value drivers, of which the cash flow generated per user is
the most important.
By allowing for different starting points of the telecom firms in our asymmetric
scenario, we identify the initial number of users as the second main value driver.
Whereas for the incumbent firms (such as T-Mobile and Mannesmann Mobilfunk)
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the investment pays off in most of the
scenarios, almost the opposite is true
for the newcoming firms in the Ger-
man telecommunication market (e.g.
Group G3 and to a lesser extent Mo-
bilCom). For them, a lot of effort will
be necessary to earn the initial invest-
ment outlays. Even with rather large
cash flows per user the total net value (including the growth option) is negative (see
chart). With these results, implications for the firms’ future strategies can be readily
inferred.
By pursuing our real options analysis, we are able to shed a new light on the
value of UMTS-licenses. With better information on the underlying parameters,
our approach can be used to improve this new valuation technique even further. In
addition, it provides a perfect tool and starting point to address related valuation
problems.
ii
1 Introduction
Given the speed of technological progress, it is often very difficult to assess the value
of investments in high-tech industries such as the telecommunication industry. For
the outside observer it seems as if a significant number of investments are undertaken
without a precise quantitative approach. Very often relative valuation methods are
used or simple multiplicative methods are employed. This becomes quite obvious in
the course of merger activities. Projects or firms are valued relative to the value of
their competitors. Alternatively, sales multiple valuations (e.g. number of customers
times the implicit value of a customer) are employed. All these very crude and often
misleading measures are used since the correct method, namely a properly designed
contingent claims analysis, seems to be difficult to implement.
Besides a high degree of uncertainty, a high degree of future flexibility is inherent
in these types of investment. We show that these difficulties can be resolved and
apply a real options approach to one of the most widely discussed investments in
the telecommunication area, the investment in UMTS-licenses. The development of
a real options model allows us to capture and quantify the uncertainty as well as
the potential value of flexibility associated with the new mobile phone technology.
The value of flexibility stems from the fact that this new technology enables the
operators to potentially exploit the spectrum of transmission by supplying further
applications. In the UMTS market, operators will introduce the most profitable
applications first, like multi-media messaging and news and information services. In
addition to these early applications, there exists the option to expand into further
application if the customer base has evolved properly and the new applications can
be expected to generate sufficient cash flows.
In order to capture these characteristics, we develop a model containing a com-
bination of an abandonment with a growth option. Our approach differs from many
other real option models (see e.g. Micalizzi 1999) by using an indirect way to model
the value of the inherent option. Since there is no appropriate traded security which
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we may use as an underlying, we have to solve a more difficult valuation problem.
Among other things, we can not make use of a closed form solution (e.g. the Black-
Scholes formula) but rather have to rely on numerical procedures. However, letting
the number of users follow the stochastic process has the advantage of using a varia-
ble which is easily observed and verified. To model the stochastic process, we apply a
standard Cox et al. (1979) multiplicative binomial approach. From a methodological
point of view and with respect to the focus of the analysis, Schwartz/Moon (2000)
and Schwartz/Zozaya-Gorostiza (2000) who use a least-square Monte Carlo valua-
tion approach developed by Longstaff/Schwartz (1998) are the studies most closely
related to ours. We apply our approach to the specific case of UMTS-licenses in Ger-
many, allowing the licensees to operate this technology potentially until 2020. By
pursuing an extended sensitivity analysis we investigate the most crucial parameters
for the value of the investments under consideration.
We show that two variables affect the total value of the investment particularly:
the initial customer base of a firm and the net cash flows generated per user. With
regard to the former variable it turns out to be very helpful to distinguish between
incumbent and newcoming firms. Incumbents can build on a fairly established cu-
stomer base and hence have better chances to gain a larger market share than a
newcoming firm. Consequently, the net value of a licence substantially differs bet-
ween the two types of firms. Our valuation approach can therefore not only be used
to analyze the value of the UMTS-licenses but, by pointing to the crucial value dri-
vers, also serves as an important starting point for a properly designed management
strategy for the owner of UMTS-licenses.
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section we outline the basic struc-
ture of our real options model. In section 3, we use our approach to analyze the
potential value of UMTS-licenses, focusing on the German market. We thereby di-
stinguish between the symmetric and the asymmetric case, the latter taking account
of differing starting points among the telecom companies. In section 4, we provide
a brief discussion of further extensions to our approach and conclude the analysis.
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2 A Simple Model of Two Real Options
The starting point of our modelling approach is that the number of users adopting
the new technology follows a stochastic process. In the base model, the representative
user is assumed to generate at least a given amount of revenues using the available
services. Subtracting variable costs from revenues gives us the cash flows per user in
each period. These cash flows per user have to be contrasted with a total fixed cost
per firm in each period under consideration. This implies that total cash flows per
period may decline to a negative value, which forms the basis of our abandonment
option. Whenever expected future net cash flows (cash flows per user times number of
users minus costs) become negative, it is sensible to abandon the project altogether.
This flexibility during the life of the project creates additional value – the value of
the abandonment option.
Initially, the project is started with the most promising applications of the new
technology and with the option to expand these applications into new fields by inve-
sting a certain amount (in marketing, technological developments etc). This creates
a growth option: the firm has the option to raise future cash flows by expanding
in these usages (which, by the way, also may increase fixed costs per period). This
flexible investment strategy is undertaken if it creates value, the value of the growth
option.
A vital point of our approach is that it is the number of users, U , which follows
a stochastic process, and not a traded security which would serve as an underlying.
We assume the number of users to follow a geometric Brownian motion in any small
time interval dt
dU = αUdt+ σUdz (1)
with α being the drift rate of the number of users. σ reflects the instantaneous
standard deviation of U , and ∆z is an increment of a standard Wiener process. The
above continuous diffusion process can be approximated by an equivalent discrete-
time process with the same first two moments (see Trigeorgis (1996), p. 321). The
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stochastic process lasts for T periods. In the discrete-time case we divide T by the
number of steps N in order to get the discrete time intervals ∆t = T/N . Within
each time interval, U follows a Markov random walk with drift. With probability p it
increase from U to u ·U and with the complimentary probability (1−p) it decreases
to l ·U (with u = 1/l). The expected number of user in period t+1 is Ut+1 = Ute
α∆t,
hence
Ute
α∆t = puUt + (1− p)lUt (2)
Using the definition of the variance it must hold that
pu2 + (1− p)l2 − [pu+ (1− p)l]2 = σ2 (3)
Taking the conditions u = 1/l, ∆t = T/N together with Eqs. (2) and (3) yields1
p =
eαT/N − l
u− l
u = eσ
√
∆t (4)
l = e−σ
√
∆t
This allows us to express the number of users at time t as a function of the starting
number of users, U0,
Ut(i) = U0u
ilt−i (5)
where u and l are given in equation (4). The index i refers to the number of increases
realised up to this point.
We are now in a position to define the net cash flow stream. By assumption, the
representative user generates revenues (net of variable costs) X. In addition, firms
have to take their fixed cost expenses (F ) into account. Therefore, we get for total
net cash flows in period t with i increases in the number of users (and t − i steps
downward) starting from U0:
Ct(i) = Ut(i)X − F (6)
1See for a detailed discussion of a related derivation Hull (2000), chapter 16.
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If the project is continued throughout the growth period (from t = 0 to t = T )
under all eventualities, we can define the expected value of the project at any point
(t, i) recursively as
EVt(i) = Ct(i) + [pEVt+1(i+ 1) + (1− p)EVt+1(i)] e
−r (7)
for 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1. This value consists of the current period’s cash flows and the
expected present value as of the subsequent period, in t + 1. By noting that the
number of users is stationary after T and therefore net cash flows stay the same
between T and the final period of the project, T ∗, we can calculate the expected
value of the project at point (T, i)
EVT (i) =
T ∗∑
τ=T
CT (i)e
−r(τ−T ) (8)
as the sum of discounted cash flows in the remaining periods.2With the project value
at the end of the growth period being hence defined, we will be able to calculate
the expected project values of earlier periods by recursion, using equation (7).3
Ultimately, this gives us the expected project value in the initial period, EV0(i = 0).
Carrying the project through all bad realization is, however, not always an eco-
nomically optimal decision. Instead, it is value-maximizing to abandon the project
if (and only if) the foreseen value of the project at a certain point (t, i) is negati-
ve. Taking this into account, gives us a new expression for the (optimal) expected
value of the project which already takes this kind of flexibility of management into
account:
EV˜t(i) = Ct(i) + max {pEVt+1(i+ 1) + (1− p)EVt+1(i), 0} e
−r (9)
for 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1, and
EV˜T (i) = CT (i) + max{
T ∗∑
τ=T+1
CT (i)e
−r(τ−T ), 0} (10)
2Strictly speaking, this is no ’expected’ value any more, as any uncertainty about future cash
flows has been resolved at t = T .
3Technically, this was done by means of a fairly simple routine programmed in Visual Basic.
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Consequently, the total value of the abandonment option can be derived as
AO0 = EV˜0 − EV0 (11)
Right from the starting point of the project, firms have the possibility to expand
the existing applications into new fields. By investing Z, new applications can be
acquired and used by the customers. This generates additional revenues but also
additional costs. Whereas net cash flows increase by a factor m (m > 1) with the
new set of applications, fixed costs per period now amount to nF (n > 1). In case
this growth option is exercised new cash flow in each period t read as:
CNt (i) = Ut(i)mX − nF (12)
Hence, the additional net cash flows per period which stem from exercising the
growth option are
∆CNt (i) = C
N
t (i)− Ct(i) (13)
Investing Z in t leads to these additional cash flows starting from t+1 until T ∗, the
end of the project.
Exercising the growth option is only sensible until the last period of the growth
process: a firm, having reached period T without having exercised the growth option
yet, will know its future cash flows completely. It will then either immediately exer-
cise the option, or not exercise it at all. The value of the growth option in period T
can hence be expressed as
GOT (i) = max{EV˜
N
T (i)− EV˜T (i)− Z, 0} (14)
where
EV˜ NT (i) = CT (i) + max{
T ∗∑
τ=T+1
CNT (i)e
−r(τ−T ), 0} (15)
defines the expected value of the project after an expansion into the new applica-
tions in T . Similarly, for earlier periods (0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1) this value, including the
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abandonment option, is defined as
EV˜ Nt (i) = Ct(i) +max
{
p
(
EV˜ Nt+1(i+ 1) + ∆C
N
t+1(i+ 1)
)
+(1− p)
(
EV˜ Nt+1(i) + ∆C
N
t+1(i)
)
, 0
}
e−r (16)
For the remaining points in time, i.e. from t = 0 to T − 1, we have to take into
account that waiting (that is to postpone exercise of the growth option) is a valid
alternative. Therefore, we have to balance the value of immediate execution against
the value of later execution. The value of the growth option can thus be written as:
GOt(i) = max
{
EV˜ Nt (i)− EV˜t(i)− Z, (pGOt+1(i+ 1) + (1− p)GOt+1(i))e
−r
}
(17)
Combing (9) and (17) yields the total value of the entire cash flow stream:
TVt(i) = EV˜t(i) +GOt(i) . (18)
Again, we are thus able to derive the total value in the initial period, TV0(i = 0),
numerically by recursion.
3 Valuation of UMTS-Licenses
3.1 Facts behind the German UMTS-Licenses
3.1.1 What is UMTS all about?
Universal Mobile Telecommunication System, or UMTS, represents the third gene-
ration mobile transmission technology. This new technology will enable high speed,
high quality mobile multimedia applications. UMTS allows an increase in trans-
mission speed of up to 2 Mbps (which is almost 200 times the speed of today’s
GSM technology). UMTS not only provides significant improvements with respect
to the currently prevailing GSM technology, but also with respect to the interme-
diate GPRS and EDGE technologies. In contrast to the latter, the main difference
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is not in speed capabilities but rather in its efficient use of the transmission spec-
trum which allows a larger set of potential applications with UMTS. This increase
in spectrum is the main value of the new technology: it allows to supply, besides the
volume of oral communication services, a large set of multi-media services. From the
current point of view, one can distinguish seven potential areas of applications: oral
communication, mobile orientation support (e.g. electronic city maps), transmission
of games and news, multi-media messaging, m-commerce, video-transmission and
access to the internet via mobile phone. It is expected that the mobile phone ope-
rators will start with the first four applications and keep the option to expand into
the other applications.
3.1.2 The German Auction
The German government allocated licenses to operate UMTS in Germany through a
multi-period sealed-bid auction. The UMTS-licensees are allowed to operate a mobile
phone service on the basis of the UMTS-standard until 2020. Of the two stages of
the entire auction only the first one was economically important. In this first stage
120MHz of paired spectrum have been sold in twelve blocks. Since each bidder could
bid for either two or three blocks, the total number of licenses was not predetermined.
With two or three block licensees, respectively, the number of potential licensees
ranged between four and six. The number of paired blocks each participant in the
auction was bidding for was of vital strategic importance. Depending on the final
number of blocks, four, five or six firms would have had to split the future German
market. A crucial feature of the auction was that a bidder could never increase the
number of blocks he was bidding for over time. That is, a firm bidding for two blocks
once could never bid for three blocks anymore. This – and the foreseen impact on
the division of the entire market – gave a strong incentive to bid for three blocks,
especially for the incumbents.
Initially twelve bidders backed by individual firms or groups of firms submitted
to participate in the German auction. Of these twelve only seven finally entered the
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auction process. The group of bidders was quite heterogenous, consisting of basically
four incumbent firms (the two market leaders with their operating systems D1 and
D2 as well as networks E1 and E2 with a smaller customer base) and three entrants
(Group 3G, Mobilcom Multimedia and Debitel).
After 11 days and a total sum of all bids of almost Euro 40 billion, one of the
bidders, Debitel, dropped out of the race. However, since the market leaders, Man-
nesmann Mobilfunk and Deutsche Telekom, were bidding for three blocks the auction
continued. After 3 further days and a lot of gossip regarding implicit cooperation
among the two market leaders (explicit cooperation was strictly forbidden under
the greatest possible sanction: the exclusion from the bidding process) the auction
finally came to an end. To the surprise of many observers the entrants did not drop
out of the race and the incumbents finally surrendered. The incumbents decided to
bid only for two blocks at the cost of an emerging 6-competitor-market. The total
sum of bids amounted to Euro 50.5 billion. Due to the symmetric outcome of the
bidding process each of the six licensees had to pay more than Euro 8.3 billion.
As already mentioned, the group of licensees is quite heterogenous. This can be
illustrated best by looking at the number of mobile-phone customers these companies
or groups of companies had at the end of the year 2000. The two market leaders,
Deutsche Telekom MobilNet and the Vodafone subsidiary, Mannesmann Mobilfunk
both had almost the same number of customers, 19.1 and 19.2 million, respectively
(see FAZ 2001). In contrast, Viag Intercom (belonging to British Telecom) and E-
Plus (subsidiary of the Dutch telecom company KPN) could rely only on 3 million
and 6.6 million customers, respectively. MobilCom, which has been regarded by some
observers of the auction as the most aggressive bidder, will start from a relative small
customer base with 4 million customers at the end of 2000. It can, however, rely on
the financial ressources of its strategic partner, France Telecom. The sixth licensee,
the consortium G3, consisting of the Spanish Telefonica and the Finnish Sonera
have to start with basically no initial customer base (and experience of the German
market). They are usually considered as being the weakest in the market. These
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numbers clearly indicate that the starting position of the different licensees is highly
asymmetric, a point we will exploit later in our analysis.
3.2 The Symmetric Case
In order to evaluate UMTS-licenses with the help of our model outlined in section
2, we have to specify the parameters underlying the real option model. We start by
looking at the symmetric case. For this purpose, we assume that all firms owning a
UMTS-license are ex-ante in the same position, that is, they all start with the same
number of customers and have the same potential to acquire new customers. Fur-
thermore, in the symmetric set-up, all firms have the same cost structure. Therefore,
we basically analyze the value of the average UMTS-license. In the next subsection,
we recognize that there are important asymmetries in the German market for mobile
phones, which may very well lead to different values for the different licensees.
In order to specify our parameters we proceed in two steps. First, we introduce
a group of parameters which we leave unchanged throughout all our calculations in
this subsection. For a second group of parameters, we start with a benchmark case.
We then perform sensitivity analyses in which we alter the parameters of this second
group, departing always from the benchmark case. By choosing our parameters we
follow the idea that we want to ask for situations in which it is most unlikely for
the UMTS-licenses to pay off. For that reason, we tend to choose for our first group
of parameters a rather optimistic version. If the UMTS-licenses are not profitable
against this scenario this is obviously bad news and implies, among other things,
that the licencees should think very hard about possibilities to improve the rate of
return of their investments.
With the first group of parameters, we determine the starting point and the
expected end-point for the group of users (customers) belonging to each firm. Given
a total population of approximately 65 million people being 14 years or older and an
assumed penetration rate of 100%, the final number of customers will approach 65
10
million.4 Considering the experience of recent trends in the mobile phone market in
Germany, a period of 4 years for the switch of all users to UMTS seems to be rather
realistic. Figures for the growth of users of conventional mobile phones of more than
80 % (for the entire market) lead us to such an estimate. Furthermore, we start
with one million users per firm in the initial period (i.e. 2002). This is the group
of users which is willing to switch technologies very easily. The number of initial
users chosen is identical to the number of users having adopted mobile phones with
wireless application protocol (WAP) rather shortly after its introduction (see FAZ
2001).
The initial and expected final number of users together with the assumption on
the growth period (4 years) then leads us to a trend (growth) rate of 81% per year.
In our computation we divide the four years into monthly steps. Since the number of
users obviously does not follow a deterministic path, we combine a very optimistic
and a very pessimistic case in order to compute the stochastic component of the
development of the number of users. In the optimistic case, the licensee captures 50
percent of the entire market, whereas in the pessimistic scenario the market share
drops below 1 percent. This gives us for our stochastic process an annual standard
deviation of 25 percent. The drift rate and the standard deviation remain unchanged
after execution of the growth option. The fixed costs per period stem from the rental
of the necessary telecommunication infrastructure. With a total cost of Euro 5 billion
and an annual rental rate of 12 per cent, the fixed costs amount to Euro 600 million
per year.5 Finally, we set the cost to exercise the growth option to Euro 1 billion.
With respect to the second group of parameters, we define a benchmark case and
4Given that, due to business customers, a significant proportion of persons are users in more
than one function, this does not seem to be too unrealistic.
5Obviously this is a rather crude approximation of the underlying economics. Considering these
costs as fixed rather than sunk costs is justifiable if, in case of a negative development of market
shares, the equipment can be shifted to a firm gaining market shares. This latter firm then needs
the equipment in order to provide the technological base for the larger-than-average number of
customers.
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then pursue a sensitivity analysis. For the interest rate, the benchmark is, as already
mentioned, 12 percent. We assume that the UMTS-licences will be in place for 15
years, i.e. almost until their legal end (the year 2020). This implies that there is a
period of 11 years with zero growth, starting at the end of the growth period (i.e. in
2006). The benchmark realization of cash flows per users is defined with reference
to actual cash flows generated in the current generation of mobile phones and is
thus set to Euro 20. This value includes an increase in net cash flows which seems
justified given the expectation of new applications with UMTS. Recent estimates by
Forrester Research (2001) support this benchmark assumption, as the group predicts
gross revenues per year and customer to be around Euro 440. With respect to the
growth option and the related possibility to expand the applications to new ones,
we adopt a factor of 1.5 by which cash flows as well as fixed costs increase. The
proportional increase of cash flows and fixed costs is for simplicity only. Table 1
gives an overview over all parameters used in our benchmark case.
Table 1: The Parameters of the Benchmark Case
First Group Second Group
growth period 4 years interest rate (p.a.) 12 %
initial number of users 1 m monthly cash flows per user Euro 20
standard deviation (p.a.) 25 % no growth period 11 years
drift rate (p.a.) 81 % cash flow growth factor 1.5
fixed costs (p.a.) Euro 600 m fixed cost growth factor 1.5
price of a license Euro 8.4 bn
exercise cost Euro 1 bn
We are now in the position to use our theoretical model and calculate the value of
the UMTS-license for the benchmark scenario. Table 2 reports the results.
The numbers in Table 2 reflect the value of the cash flows discounted to the
investment period (2000) minus the initial investment outlay (Euro 8.35 billion) for
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Table 2: Valuations (in Euro Million) in the Benchmark Case
Simple Valuation Value of Abandonment Total Net Value
Option (with Growth Option)
-1220.3 0.12 1824.1
each firm. The numbers indicate that the abandonment option is of little value (in the
benchmark case it has almost no value at all). This is due to the high drift rate and
the assumption of 1 million customers in the initial period for the symmetric case. In
contrast to the abandonment option, however, it turns out that the existence of the
growth option is crucial for a positive value of the entire investment. The possibility
to increase the stream of cash flows by fifty per cent has in many situations a positive
net present value and therefore leads to an exercise of the growth option.
To understand the details of the process better, we depict the development of
the number of users as well as the value and optimal exercise of the growth option
in two graphs, reporting only each fourth step. Looking at the graphs, one has to
keep in mind that the probability of downward steps is much lower (0.17) relative
to upward steps (0.83). This is a consequence of the high drift rate underlying the
assumed stochastic process. The low probability of a reduction in the number of users
is also the reason for the very low value of the abandonment option. In contrast,
due to the high probability of upward steps, the growth option is weighted with
high probabilities and therefore rather valuable. A look at Figure 2 reveals that the
growth option is typically not exercised immediately (the lower value 1 in Figure 2
indicates exercise of the option) as it pays off to wait another period. Waiting has
the advantage that more information becomes valid, thereby increasing the expected
value of exercising the growth option. That is, the expected value of exercising the
option immediately is initially lower than the value of waiting for some uncertainty
to be resloved.
In order to pursue a sensitivity analysis of our results, we now alter the para-
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Figure 1: The Evolution of the Number of Users in the Benchmark Case
1.0
0.0
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.6
1.0
1.8
3.2
5.7
10.1
17.9
31.9
0.0
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.4
0.7
1.3
2.4
4.2
7.5
13.4
23.9
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.6
1.0
1.8
3.2
5.7
10.1
17.9
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.4
0.7
1.3
2.4
4.2
7.5
13.4
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.6
1.0
1.8
3.2
5.7
10.1
0.1
0.2
0.4
0.7
1.3
2.4
4.2
7.5
0.2
0.3
06
1.0
1.8
3.2
5.7
0.2
0.4
0.7
1.3
2.4
4.2
0.3
0.6
1.0
1.8
3.2
0.4
0.7
1.3
2.4
0.6
1.0
1.8
0.7
1.3
meters of our second group stepwise. That is, we keep all other parameters in line
with the benchmark case and investigate the resulting values for a range of different
realisations of a single parameter. With respect to the cash flows per users we allow
for a range of Euro 5 to 35. Given that these are cash flows net of variable costs and
since we allow cash flows to increase by 50 percent in the growth option, this implies
that net cash flows per user may increase to Euro 52.5 per months, which is quite
an extreme value. On the other hand, we consider Euro 5 per user and month to be
the lower bound. Obviously, the value of the license without the growth option as
well as the growth option value itself increase significantly with cash flows per users.
Since with low values of the cash-flow-per-user variable the abandonment option
has a positive value this increase is initially more than proportionally. For higher
cash-flow-per-user numbers, the value increases proportionally. The critical number
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Figure 2: The Value of the Growth Option (Million Euro) and Optimal Exercise
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for the overall value (including the growth option) to become positive is between
Euro 15 and 20, Euro 17.6 to be precise.
Higher interest rates lead to a decrease in the value of cash flows realized in later
periods. Hence, the value of the investment as well as the option value decrease.
It turns out that the options (the abandonment as well as the growth option) are
exercised earlier since the value of waiting decreases with an increase in the rate of
interest. Keeping all other variables at the level of the benchmark case, the cut-off
level is 14.2 per cent. For lower (higher) values the total value is positive (negative).
Altering the length of the no-growth period is basically an approximation of
modelling a technological breakthrough. The assumption that the UMTS technology
will last, from an economic point of view, until 2016 is, to say the least, optimistic.
Given the past speed of change in this area, an earlier replacement of this technology
15
Table 3.1: Varying Cash Flows per User
Cash Flows per Net Value without GO Value of GOa Total Net Value
User (Euro) (Million Euro) (Million Euro) (Million Euro)
5 -8385.3 43.3 -8350.8
10 -6491.4 899.7 -5774.1
15 -3862.4 2299.8 -2029.0
20 -1220.3 3818.9 1824.1
25 1422.6 5381.1 5712.4
30 4065.6 6967.7 9620.2
35 6708.5 8571.7 13541.9
aThe value of the growth option is always calculated for the start of the project (2002)
rather than for the period in which the UMTS-auction took place and the license had to be
paid (2000).
is quite likely. An argument against the replacement, however, is the large size of
the investment and the incentive structure underlying the potential R&D race. This
implies that, due to the profit destruction effect, the incumbent firms have very little
incentive to undertake R&D and adopt a new technology. Furthermore, they have
a strong incentive to strategically defer new technological development which is not
too difficult, given the network externalities prevailing in this sector. But despite
these arguments a shorter length of the no-growth period is worthwhile to consider.
A glance at table 3.3 reveals that the length of the no-growth period is important
for the licenses having a positive value. Whereas in the absence of the growth option
the value is always negative, the total value becomes positive if the no-growth period
exceeds 7.4 years.
As our previous discussion revealed, the growth option is crucial for a positive
net present value of the UMTS-licenses. For the growth option, in turn, the factor at
which cash flows and fixed costs increase after the execution of the option (i.e. after
having extended the business into the new areas) is vital. This variable only affects
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Table 3.2: Interest Rates
Interest Rate Net Value without GO Value of GO Total Net Value
(Million Euro) (Million Euro) (Million Euro)
0.04 6901.5 7474.9 13812.4
0.08 1929.4 5282.8 6458.5
0.12 -1220.3 3818.9 1824.1
0.16 -3278.0 2816.1 -1185.2
0.20 -4660.7 2113.4 -3193.1
Table 3.3: Length of No-growth Period
Period Length Net Value without GO Value of GO Total Net Value
(Years) (Million Euro) (Million Euro) (Million Euro)
3 -4968.2 1473.7 -3793.4
5 -3693.1 2269.8 -1883.7
7 -2676.6 2906.1 -359.9
9 -1866.3 3414.0 855.3
11 -1220.3 3818.9 1824.1
15 -294.7 4399.0 3212.1
the value of the growth option. The critical cash flow factor at which the total value
turns into positive territory is 1.25. That is, given our benchmark case, the firms
need at least a potential increase of 25 percent in order for the UMTS-investment
outlays to pay off.
The overall point of our sensitivity analysis is that basically all variables (of our
second group) are important for a positive net present value. However, the cash-
flow-per-user variable appears to have the highest impact on the total value (and its
fluctuation) given its uncertainty relative to the other benchmark parameters.
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Table 3.4: Increase of Cash Flows (and Fixed Fosts) with Growth Option
Growth Factor Net Value without GO Value of GO Total Net Value
(Million Euro) (Million Euro) (Million Euro)
1.2 -1220.3 1085.0 -355.4
1.4 -1220.3 2900.3 1091.8
1.6 -1220.3 4739.3 2577.8
1.8 -1220.3 6584.0 4028.5
2.0 -1220.3 8430.9 5500.8
2.2 -1220.3 10278.8 6973.9
3.3 The Asymmetric Case
We now depart from our symmetric scenario and allow for asymmetries between
the different licensees. This reflects, among other things, the notion that the mobile
phone market is characterized by the existence of network externalities. These net-
work externalities are on the one hand due to technological reasons (a firm which
has more users will build more transmitters and achieves thereby a higher degree
of reachability) and on the other hand economic factors prevail, such as optimal
pricing strategies (lower prices of intra-net calls compared to calls across different
firms’ nets). Therefore, firms with a better starting position are more likely to suc-
ceed later on, compared to newcoming firms. Given that there are switching costs (or
simply convencience losses) when switching from one firm to another while adopting
the new technology, it is most likely that firms such as T-Mobile and Mannesmann
Mobilfunk start with a larger number of initial customers. They will hence be able to
gain customers more easily, as compared to newcoming firms without an established
customer base.
We proceed in two steps: in the first step, we analyze the value of UMTS-licenses
for newcoming firms with a lower number of initial customers and therefore also with
a lower expected market share. In a second step we turn to the incumbent telecom
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companies and their UMTS-licenses. Hence, we start with a larger than average
customer base and allow for a larger than average expected number of users.
For a newcoming firm (e.g. Group G3), the initial customer base is assumed to
be rather low. We therefore start from a modified benchmark case with an initial
number of 0.5 million users. In order to end up with an expected number of users
below industry average, we reduce the drift rate and the standard deviation in the
benchmark case for the newcoming firm to 75 percent and 23 per cent, respectively.
These new numbers lead to an expected number of 4.8 million users (a market share
of 8 per cent). In the most optimistic scenario 12 million customers will be using
the services of the company under investigation. Combining these numbers with the
remaining benchmark parameters outlined in table 1 yields the following results:
in the absence of the growth option, the value of the UMTS-license amounts to
Euro -7103.3 million. Since the growth option has rather little value (Euro 575.0
million), the total value amounts to Euro -6644.9 million. We also find that the
abandonment option has a small, but positive value (26.1 million Euro). Overall,
the gross value of the investment falls significantly short of the initial investment
outlay. Under which circumstances will this broad picture change, or, when will we
observe positive net present values for the newcoming firms? We try to answer this
question by investigating the effects of a variation in the cash flow per user variable.
It turns out, however, that in our initial cash-flow-per-user range total values remain
always negative. Only if we increase it to over a rather unrealistic 40.0 Euro (i.e. with
the growth option to 60.0 Euro) do we enter positive territory. Table 4 illustrates
the relationship between cash flows per users and the project value for an extended
range of this variable.
Obviously, reducing the length of the no-growth period even worsens matters. If
we extend the no-growth period to 15 years, i.e. the legally given official maximum,
we still do not get a positive value. But even if the technology would last forever
net present value of the investment remains negative for the newcoming firm. Pretty
much the same pattern emerges when pursuing a sensitivity check for the interest
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Table 4: Cash Flows per User and Total Value for Newcomers
Cash Flows per Net Value without GO Value of GO Total Net Value
User (Euro) (Million Euro) (Million Euro) (Million Euro)
10 -8385.3 9.9 -8377.4
20 -7103.3 575.0 -6644.9
30 -4789.1 1744.2 -3398.6
40 -2455.9 3060.5 -16.1
50 -121.9 4424.3 3405.1
60 2212.2 5813.8 6846.9
rate. Even if we decrease the interest rate to zero per cent, the total value remains
still negative. These rather strong results are the outcome of the low customer base
assumed in our benchmark scenario for the newcoming firms. Somewhat surprisingly,
we find that we have to increase the cash flow and fixed cost factor associated with
the growth option by more than 400 percent in order to get a positive number for
the total value of the investment. This, too, is due to the low customer base, which
reduces the leverage created by the growth option.
Given that we take our starting position as well as the stochastic time path of
the number of users for granted, it turns out to be rather difficult for newcomers to
earn their initial investment outlays. Our analysis suggests that there are only two
alternatives for newcoming firms to turn their UMTS-investments into a success.
Either they push hard in order to get a larger customer base (via marketing, better
services, prices, etc) and/or they try to extract larger cash flows per user. Among
the problems associated with such a strategy is that these two instruments are not
independent of each other but are most likely to be negatively correlated. That
is, trying to grasp a larger customer base e.g. via marketing bears the risk of a
substantial increase in costs and hence lower cash flows per user. Increasing cash
flows per user (via pricing), in turn, may deter new customers. Therefore, these firms
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have to find a delicate balance between these two partially contradicting approaches.
For incumbent firms it is (almost by definition) much easier to achieve a positive
total value from an ex-ante point of view. We start from an initial customer base of
2 million, admittedly an optimistic assumption. We chose the parameter such that
an incumbent firm captures an expected market share of 25 percent at the end of the
growth period. In the most optimistic scenario the incumbent has 50 percent of all
users as customers.6 This yields a drift rate of 70 per cent and a standard deviation
of 21 percent
Our modified benchmark case for the incumbent results in a net project value of
Euro 4997.0 million in the absence of the growth option and in Euro 10948 million
with the growth option. The growth option is therefore worth Euro 5951.0 million
in discounted terms. The sensitivity analysis for the cash flows per user is depicted
in table 5 and shows that the cut-off level is significantly below Euro 15 per user
and month.
The table reveals that for already rather moderate levels of cash flows per user
(Euro 15 per month and above), the growth option is important but not vital for
an incumbent. Given that cash flows are at least this size, the incumbent telephone
companies may end up with a positive net-present-value investment in UMTS even
if the growth opportunity vanishes in thin air for some reason. This case may be
due to the shortcoming of the corresponding technologies and/or overestimates of
the degree of the growth potentials.
Unlike the situation of the newcomer, the effect of the parameters of our second
group are not as important as the impact of cash flows per user on total value,
at least for values within sensible ranges. A main reason for this is that the value
6This latter scenario might be called overly optimistic. However, our purpose was to consider
quite an optimistic case with regard to the evolution of the customer base. This then reveals the
lower range of parameters giving us still a positive total value. Furthermore, technical reasons
restrict us in the choice of the standard deviation as we have to take the consistency restriction
of the Cox et al. (1979) approach into account. For that reason, our chosen standard deviation
represents, ceteris paribus, a lower bound.
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Table 5: Cash Flows per User and Total Value for Incumbents
Cash flows per Net Value without GO Value of GO Total Net Value
User (Euro) (Million Euro) (Million Euro) (Million Euro)
5 -7567.3 341.6 -7294.9
10 -3397.6 2484.7 -1416.8
15 799.7 4935.6 4734.3
20 4997.0 7465.0 10948.0
30 13391.6 12643.3 23470.7
50 30180.9 23166.6 48649.1
60 38575.5 28431.7 61241.0
remains positive even in the absence of the growth option. With respect to the length
of the no-growth period we find that the total value (including the growth option)
remains positive if the length is reduced to three years. That is, a replacement of
UMTS in 2009 obviously reduces the value of the licenses but it does not make them
a negative net-present-value investment for incumbent firms. This however depends
crucially on the realisation of the other parameters as specified. Finally, since the
total value of the investment is already positive in the benchmark case excluding the
value of the growth option, it is obvious that the cash flow factor does not contribute
anything to the sign, but only to the (positive) level of the project value.
The second major parameter from an incumbent’s point of view is the discount
rate. One needs, however, quite large rates of interest to jeopardize the positive net
present value of the UMTS-license. The critical interest rate level is slightly above
22.7 percent. In a nutshell, we can state that, given our assumptions on the evolution
of the number of users, matters look pretty good for incumbent firms. The main risk
stems from low cash flows per user – and from overly optimistic assumptions about
the development of the customer base.
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4 Final Remarks
Our analysis has been designed as a quantitative investigation of the potential of one
of the most costly (and also most uncertain) investments undertaken by a group of
companies in recent business history. We argue that due to inherent uncertainties, i.e.
the risks and chances of the investment, and the fact that the licensees may provide
a larger number of potential fields of application, a traditional cash flow analysis falls
short of taking all these aspects properly into account. By modelling the valuation
of German UMTS-licenses as compounded real options we take all these aspects into
account. We focus on two particular options: an abandonment option and a growth
option, i.e. the possibility to expand business into new directions if the number
of users evolves positively. Since the number of users is the natural candidate for
the stochastic process over time, we can not rely on conventional option pricing
formulas, such as Black-Scholes, to compute the value of our options but have to
rely on numerical analysis.
In the course of the numerical analysis, the relevant issues of UMTS-licenses from
the point of view of the licensees are clearly revealed. It turns out that besides the
relative position of the individual licensees relative to the competitors (especially
with respect to the initial number of users), the cash flow generated by each user
is a vital variable. We show that in our rather optimistic benchmark case, 20 Euros
per user and month are sufficient to get an investment with positive net present
value. Our sensitivity analysis reveals, however, that for a number of parameter
constellations, the existence of the growth option is not only important but crucial
for enabling the licensees to earn their initial investment outlays in the future.
One of the main messages of our analysis is, however, that while it is most likely
that the investment will pay off for an incumbent firm, it will be a real uphill battle
for the newcoming firms. Only if the latter are able to achieve very considerable
growth rates in the number of users they will have a chance to come close to break-
even. Our analysis suggests that they have at best a chance to make small profits
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but at the same time face a high probability of significant losses.
Obviously, our model and the numerical analysis rest on a number of debatable
assumptions. First and foremost, we treated the cash flows per users as constant over
time and exogenous. This assumptions rests on the objective to leave the model
as simple as possible. Allowing the cash flows to vary of time (and to follow a
second stochastic process) and depend on the actions of firms is a clear way to
potentially improve our analysis. The risk of doing this is to introduce a certain
degree of arbitrariness which we tried to avoid with our explicit sensitivity analysis.
Furthermore, we could as well ask whether our fixed costs (i.e. the infrastructure
outlays) are indeed fixed rather than sunk costs. In summary, there are a number of
ways in which future research can improve our present, first step towards an explicit
valuation of a highly uncertain investment and its inherent flexibility.
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